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Canada and the USA have developed a series of
cooperative initiatives that address transboundary
ﬁsheries issues in the Gulf of Maine. The Canada–
USA Steering Committee serves as an umbrella forum
for discussing and coordinating transboundary
management measures. Through the work of the
Transboundary Resource Assessment Committee and
the Transboundary Management Guidance Committee,
the Steering Committee has overseen the development
of joint scientiﬁc stock assessments and a sharing
agreement for groundﬁsh resources in the vicinity
of the eastern Georges Bank. The bilateral Fisheries
Enforcement Agreement helps ensure the success of
such cooperative management initiatives by combating
illegal ﬁshing in the vicinity of the international boundary. However, the largely informal ‘under the radar
screen’ arrangements, while positive on many fronts, to
date fall short of fully implementing key principles of
sustainable development, such as public participation,
the ecosystem approach, integration and precaution.

INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, Canada and the USA extended their
offshore jurisdictions to 200 nautical miles and the
Gulf of Maine became the exclusive domain of the
Canadian and US ﬁsheries.1 Although the two countries
periodically exchanged scientiﬁc information, their
ﬁsheries were managed independently.2

1
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §
1801 et seq. (Supp. 1976) established a US 200-mile fishery
conservation zone, effective from 1 March 1977; Proposed Fishing
Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, P.C. 1977-1, 110 C. Gaz.,
Extra No 101 (Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act of 1964, R.S.C.
1970, c. T-7, am. by R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 45) established
Canada’s 200-mile fishing zone, effective from 1 January 1977.
2
Transboundary Management Guidance Committee, Development
of a Sharing Allocation Proposal for Transboundary Resources of
Cod, Haddock and Yellowtail Flounder on Georges Bank, Fisheries
Management Regional Report 2002/01 (Fisheries and Oceans Canada
Maritimes Region, 2002), at 3, (‘Sharing Proposal ’), available at
<http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/tmgc/background/FMR%202002_
01.pdf>.

Problems emerged as a result of this management
structure. The countries’ jurisdictional claims overlapped,
in an approximately 30,000 km2 area, at the eastern
end of Georges Bank.3 The disputed region was home to
several commercial groundﬁsh species, including cod,
haddock and yellowtail ﬂounder. Although the jurisdictional issue was resolved, in October 1984, when the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) established the
international boundary between the two countries in
the Gulf of Maine,4 the problem of managing Georges
Bank’s transboundary ﬁsheries resources remained.
In the years following the ICJ decision, Canadian and
US ﬁshing activities were conﬁned to their respective
national jurisdictions and cooperative management
was virtually non-existent.5 Meanwhile, increased ﬁshing
efforts on both sides of the boundary, throughout the
1980s, led to the over-exploitation of the transboundary
groundﬁsh stocks.6
In response to this growing problem, Canada and the
USA developed a series of cooperative initiatives aimed
at addressing transboundary ﬁsheries issues. The
Canada–USA Steering Committee was established,
in 1995, as an umbrella forum for discussing and
coordinating transboundary management measures
in the Gulf of Maine. Through the work of its various
sub-committees and working groups, the Steering
3

G.J. Herbert, ‘Fisheries Relations in the Gulf of Maine:
Implications of an Arbitrated Maritime Boundary’, 19:4 Marine Pol’y
(1995), 301, at 306. Georges Bank is a shallow submarine bank
located along the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Maine, between
Cape Cod, Massachusetts and the province of Nova Scotia.
4
ICJ 12 October 1984, Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. USA) [1984] ICJ
Rep. 246. However, it should be noted that the ICJ was not asked
to resolve the disputed boundary around Machias Seal Island and
negotiations between Canada and the USA have, to date, not been
successful in forging an agreement on the management of lobster
resources in the disputed zone. For a detailed discussion of the
ongoing dispute, which is beyond the scope of this article, see T.A.
Cheney, Examination of the Lobster Fishery in the Internationally
Disputed ‘Grey Zone’: History, Management and Options, Unpublished
Graduate Research Project Paper (Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie
University, 2004).
5
See Sharing Proposal, n. 2 above, at 3.
6
Ibid.
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Committee has overseen the development of joint
scientiﬁc stock assessments and a sharing agreement
for eastern Georges Bank groundﬁsh, among other
schemes. The Fisheries Enforcement Agreement, adopted
by Canada and the USA in 1990, helps ensure the
success of such cooperative management initiatives
by combating illegal ﬁshing in the vicinity of the international boundary.
However, as this article highlights, the largely informal
‘under the radar screen’ arrangements to date fall short
of fully implementing key principles of sustainable
development. These principles include public participation, the ecosystem approach, integration and precaution.

BILATERAL FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT REGIME
The Canada–USA Steering Committee is the oversight
body that guides transboundary management issues
in the Gulf of Maine.7 This informal advisory group
coordinates bilateral stock assessments and a sharing
scheme for transboundary groundﬁsh resources through
the actions of the Transboundary Resource Assessment
Committee (TRAC) and the Transboundary Management
Guidance Committee (TMGC). The Steering Committee
supervises additional cooperative transboundary
initiatives in the Gulf of Maine via the Canada–USA
Integration Committee. The Steering Committee is
co-chaired by the Director-General for the Maritime
Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)
and the Northeast Regional Administrator of the US
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).8 Committee
members also include representatives of the New England
Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC), Canada’s
Gulf of Maine Advisory Committee (GOMAC), and
Canadian and US ﬁshing industries.9 The Steering
Committee meets bi-annually to discuss transboundary
7

Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Georges Bank Haddock
Report (DFO, 2006), at 13–15 (‘Haddock Report ’). It should be
noted that the Steering Committee operates within the context of
the broader cooperative relationship existing between Canada and
the USA. For example, officials from the Department of Fisheries
and Oceans and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) conduct annual informal consultations aimed at improving
bilateral communication and coordination on fisheries conservation
and management issues, including transboundary stocks in the Gulf
of Maine. See Office of International Affairs (OIA), International
Agreements Concerning Living Marine Resources of Interest to
NOAA Fisheries (National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, 2006),
at 107, available at <http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ocs/mafac/meetings/
2006_02/docs/05-06%20International%20Agreements1.pdf#search=
%22INTERNATIONAL%20AGREEMENTS%20CONCERNING%20
LIVING%20MARINE%20RESOURCES%20OF%20INTEREST%20
TO%20NOAA%20FISHERIES%20%22>.
8
F.G. Peacock and G. Peters, Draft: Canada/USA Regional
Transboundary Guidance (unpublished document on file with the
authors, undated), at 1.
9
Ibid.

resource management issues and the cooperative actions
necessary to address them.10
Under the auspices of the Steering Committee, scientists
in Canada and the USA ﬁrst compiled joint stock assessments for Georges Bank cod, haddock and yellowtail
ﬂounder in 1997. The success of this coordinated effort
led to the formation of a groundﬁsh TRAC in 1998,
which combined stock assessment and peer review
processes within the work of a single joint Canada–US
committee.11 TRAC is co-chaired by representatives from
the NMFS and DFO. Since 2000, TRAC has served as
the scientiﬁc arm of the TMGC.12 TRAC members review
ﬁshery, survey and biological data to evaluate the
status of cod, haddock and yellowtail populations on
Georges Bank, and submit annual stock assessments
to the TMGC.13
The TMGC was established, in 2000, to provide Canadian
and US decision makers with non-binding advice on
the management of transboundary cod, haddock and
yellowtail ﬂounder stocks in an effort to ensure the
consistent management of these shared resources.14
The group is composed of two government and four
ﬁshing industry representatives from each country.15
The committee is responsible for developing guidance
documents, such as harvest strategies and resourcesharing approaches, for ﬁsheries management authorities in the two countries.16
The Steering Committee’s TRAC/TMGC framework
continues to expand and will soon be applied to other
transboundary commercial ﬁsh species. A TRAC speciﬁc
to herring was formed in 200517 and work is progressing
towards the formation of a related TMGC, possibly
by 2008.18 A TRAC and TMGC for mackerel have been
proposed and may be in place as early as 2008.19 The
possibility of developing TRACs for halibut, dogﬁsh
and pollock has also been discussed.20
The most recent organizational development under the
framework of the Canada–USA Steering Committee was
10

M. Westhead, Canada/US Steering Committee (22 July 2006)
(unpublished document on file with the authors), at 1.
11
See Haddock Report, n. 7 above, at 13 –14.
12
See M. Westhead, n. 10 above, at 1.
13
See Haddock Report, n. 7 above, at 14.
14
For a general overview of the function and structure of the TMGC,
see the website available at <http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/
tmgc/ introduction.html>.
15
See ibid.; see also M. Westhead, n. 10 above, at 1.
16
See Transboundary Management Guidance Committee,
Guidance Document 2005/01 (Fisheries and Oceans Canada and
NOAA Fisheries, 2005), available at <http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/
science/tmgc/publications/GD2005_1_E.pdf> (‘Guidance Document
2005/01’).
17
See Haddock Report, n. 7 above, at 14.
18
Email from G. Peacock, Executive Director, Federal/Provincial
Relations, DFO Maritimes (5 January 2007) (on file with authors).
19
See M. Westhead, n. 10 above, at 1.
20
Ibid.
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the approval of the Canada–USA Integration Committee
(IC) in September 2005.21 The IC serves as the strategic
and operational arm of the Steering Committee, to
which it reports on a semi-annual basis.22 The IC will
also provide a direct link to the TMGCs and the various
working groups that operate under the umbrella of the
Steering Committee.23 The Species at Risk Working
Group, Habitat Working Group and Oceans Working
Group will report directly to the IC. IC membership
will be equally divided between Canada and the USA,
with the Canadian and US co-chairs selecting ad hoc
members from the TMGCs and working groups, to join
the four core members, on an issue-by-issue basis.24
The IC’s mandate, as authorized by the Steering
Committee, is to assist in the integration of policies
and ensure consistency in approach across the TMGCs
and working groups. As part of this process, the IC will
provide recommendations to, and undertake record
keeping, archival, coordination and general secretariat
services for, the Steering Committee, TMGCs and
working groups.25

SHARING ALLOCATION
FORMULA FOR GULF OF
MAINE GROUNDFISH
One of the ﬁrst tasks undertaken by the groundﬁsh
TMGC was the development of a resource-sharing
formula for allocating eastern Georges Bank cod,
haddock and yellowtail ﬂounder stocks between the
USA and Canada. The Committee’s Sharing Allocation
Proposal recommends a common ﬁshing mortalitybased US–Canadian harvest strategy for groundﬁsh
resources in a management area corresponding to the
ﬁshing unit areas 5Zj and 5Zm (5Zjm) for cod and
haddock stocks and unit areas 5Zhjmn for yellowtail
ﬂounder (see ﬁgure 1).26 The report provides recommendations for determining resource distribution patterns
within this management area and sets out a transitional schedule for proportionally allocating the stocks
between the two countries.

21

F.G. Peacock and G. Peters, Bilateral Management of Transboundary
Fish Stocks: An Informal Approach to Ecosystem-Based Management,
paper presented at the Sharing the Fish – Allocation Issues in Fisheries
Management 2006 Conference, Fremantle, Australia, March 2006,
available
at
<http://www.fishallocation.com/assets/pdf/papers/
GregPeacock.pdf>; see also M. Westhead, n. 10 above, at 4.
22
See M. Westhead, ibid.
23
Ibid., at 3–4.
24
Ibid.
25
See Haddock Report, n. 7 above, at 14–15.
26
See Sharing Proposal, n. 2 above. Fisheries and Oceans Canada’s
management area 5Zjm corresponds with the US NMFS’s statistical
fisheries units 551, 552, 561 and 562. Canadian unit area 5Zhjmn
corresponds with US units 522, 551, 552, 561, 562 and 525 (see
figure 1).
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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FIGURE 1 GEORGES BANK FISHERIES MANAGEMENT UNITS27
The Sharing Allocation Proposal represents a compromise between the disparate sharing proposals initially
suggested on behalf of Canada and the USA. Both
countries conceded that the sharing agreement should
allocate groundﬁsh stocks using a weighted formula
based on resource distribution patterns and past ﬁsheries
landings. Canada favoured a greater emphasis on
resource distribution, to which it assigned a proposed
weighting of 95%, with historical utilization to be
weighted at 5%. The USA, on the other hand, argued
that equal emphasis should be placed on resource
distribution and past ﬁsheries landings.28
The two countries eventually reached consensus on a
number of issues necessary for the development of the
resource-sharing formula. DFO ﬁshing unit area 5Zjm
was agreed upon as the management unit for the
transboundary cod and haddock stocks. The parties
agreed that groundﬁsh resource distribution patterns
would be calculated using data collected during the
three NMFS and DFO surveys carried out each year. A
compromise was also reached with regard to the time
period on which historical resource utilization patterns
would be based. The years 1967–1994 were selected in
order to exclude landings data from the period following the collapse of the Georges Bank cod and haddock
stocks. Finally, the decision was made to develop a
ﬁxed 7-year transitional schedule for implementing
the sharing agreement.29
The TMGC Sharing Formula incorporates a 7-year
transitional schedule with allocation percentages that
take into account both contemporary resource distribution and historical utilization patterns (see box 1
below). The TMGC’s proposed method for determining
the proportion of groundﬁsh stocks on either side of
the international boundary is designed to take into
account changes in resource distribution over time. The
committee recommended that distribution patterns be
27

This is adapted from ibid., at 9.
Ibid., at 38 – 44.
29
Ibid., at 6.
28
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BOX 1 RESOURCE-SHARING ALLOCATION FORMULA
Formula:
% country share = αyear country utilization
+ βyear resource distribution
where αyear = percentage weighting for utilization in year
βyear = percentage weighting for distribution in year
resource distribution = 30% less smoothing of most
recent 33 years
Country utilization:
USA
Cod
40%
Haddock
45%
Yellowtail
98%

Canada
60%
55%
2%

Percentage weighting (resource distribution/historical
landings):
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
60/40 60/40 65/35 70/30 75/25 80/20 85/15 90/10

calculated annually, using the results of the NMFS’s
spring and autumn bottom trawl surveys and DFO’s
annual winter survey for the most recent 33 years. For
estimating yellowtail ﬂounder distributions, a simple
average of the three surveys conducted each year is
employed, since this species does not exhibit marked
migration patterns. For cod and haddock, which migrate
seasonally, the TMGC proposed classifying the surveys
according to the time of year in which they were
conducted, to produce average distributions for both
the colder winter–spring half of the year and the warmer
summer–autumn half. These two seasonal distribution averages are then combined to produce a yearly
average. Finally, a statistical smoothing procedure is
applied to the averaged survey results to compensate
for any anomalies produced by statistical sampling
variation or natural, but unpredictable, ﬂuctuations in
resource distribution. The resultant ﬁgure should represent a reliable near-term (1–3 years) estimate of
stock distributions, on either side of the Canada–USA
maritime boundary, within the management area.30
The historical utilization percentages used in the sharing allocation formula are ﬁxed values that have been
calculated based on ﬁshery landings data from the
Canadian and US ﬁsheries for the years 1967–1994.31
In the ﬁrst year of the agreement, 2003, the sharing
formula assigned a weighting of 60% to resource distribution and 40% to historic utilization. This weighting
ratio gradually shifts over the course of the 7-year
transition period until resource distribution is weighted
at 90% and historical landings at 10% by 2010.32
30
The report recommends the application of a robust locally weighted
regression scatterplot smoother. See ibid., at 50–51.
31
Ibid., at 57.
32
Ibid.

TMGC GUIDANCE
DOCUMENTS
Each year, the TMGC publishes a Guidance Document
containing a summary of its recommendations to US
and Canadian ﬁsheries management authorities.33 The
reports set out the resource allocation percentages to
be applied by each country in drafting their respective
ﬁsheries management plans for the coming year.
Combined Canada–US Total Allowable Catch (TACs)
levels are suggested for eastern Georges Bank cod,
haddock and yellowtail ﬂounder resources based on
the annual stock assessments compiled by TRAC. The
TMGC then applies the sharing allocation formula to
allocate proportionally each combined TAC between the
two countries’ ﬁsheries. In addition to recommending
national quotas for the three groundﬁsh species, the
Guidance Documents provide information on past
exploitation of these ﬁsheries, the state of the resources
in terms of biomass indices, species productivity levels
and catch risk assessments for the coming ﬁshing year.34

DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE SHARING
ALLOCATION AGREEMENT
Although TRAC and the TMGC are international in
scope, the ﬁsheries management recommendations
developed through these processes must be implemented
domestically. Canada and the USA continue to develop
and execute separate ﬁsheries management plans. In
2003, Canada and the USA formally agreed to apply
the TMGC’s resource-sharing allocation formula for
Georges Bank cod, haddock and yellowtail ﬂounder to
their Gulf of Maine ﬁsheries management plans.35
In Canada, authority over the ﬁsheries is centralized
under the DFO. GOMAC was established by DFO in
1984 to serve as a government–industry forum for
discussing the management of ﬁsh stocks in the Gulf
of Maine.36 GOMAC is co-chaired by the DirectorGeneral of the Scotia-Fundy Region of DFO and a senior
member of the ﬁshing industry.37 Committee membership includes representatives from DFO, the Atlantic
provincial governments, the ﬁshing industry, the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
and the Canadian Consul in Boston. GOMAC provides

33

Guidance Documents for the years 2003 –2006 are available on
the TMGC website, available at <http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/
tmgc/tgd.html>.
34
See, e.g., Guidance Document 2005/01, n. 16 above.
35
See Haddock Report, n. 7 above, at 14.
36
Ibid., at 13.
37
For a general overview of the function and structure of GOMAC, see
the website available at <http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/e/ovrvu.htm>.

© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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DFO with consensus-based advice on transboundary
ﬁsheries issues in the Gulf of Maine, including operational, technical and scientiﬁc analyses.38 The committee
liaises with the TMGC, reviews stock status and
management assessments and recommends harvest
strategies for Gulf of Maine groundﬁsh stocks to the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.39
NEFMC is responsible for managing US ﬁsheries in
the Gulf of Maine region. The council is composed of
18 voting members, which include representatives from
the NMFS, regional State governments and nominated
knowledgeable private individuals (usually ﬁshermen).40
A further four non-voting members, representing the
US Coast Guard, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission, the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the
State Department, also participate.41 The NEFMC’s
North-East Multi-Species Fisheries Management Plan
outlines the management measures in place for a variety
of commercial ﬁnﬁsh, including Georges Bank cod,
haddock and yellowtail ﬂounder.42 The TMGC submits
its annual TAC recommendations to the NEFMC, for the
council’s consideration in the development of management strategies for the ﬁsheries under its jurisdiction.

ENFORCING FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT MEASURES
The success of any ﬁsheries regime is dependent upon
the level of participant adherence to management
measures. Non-compliance with ﬁsheries regulations
has been cited as a contributing factor in the overexploitation of ﬁsh stocks on Georges Bank.43 In the
years following the Gulf of Maine boundary delineation,
numerous incidents of US vessels illegally ﬁshing in
Canadian waters were recorded.44 Canadian authorities
faced a number of difﬁculties in enforcement near the
international boundary. To be prosecuted in Canada,
vessels ﬁshing illegally had to ﬁrst be apprehended. By

38

Ibid.
See Haddock Report, n. 7 above, at 14.
40
For a general overview of the function and structure of the NEFMC,
see the website available at <http://www.nefmc.org/about /index.html>.
See also P. Hoagland et al., Marine Area Governance and Management
in the Gulf of Maine: A Case Study (Marine Policy Center, Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution, 1996), at 14, available at <http://
www.whoi.edu/cms/files/jblythe/2005/12/Gulf_of_Maine_Final_Report_
(Aug_1996)_%5Bno_appendices%5D_6405.pdf#search=%22gulf%
20of%20maine%20a%20case%20study%20hoagland%22>.
41
See NEFMC website, ibid.
42
New England Fisheries Management Council, Fishery Management
Plan, Environmental Impact Statement, Regulatory Impact Review and
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for the Northeast Multi-Species
Fishery (NEFMC, August 1985), available at <http://www.nefmc.org/
nemulti/index.html> (‘Fishery Management Plan’).
43
See P. Hoagland et al., n. 40 above.
44
See G.J. Herbert, n. 3 above, at 301.
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staying near the boundary line, ﬁshers were often able
to escape back across the border when a Canadian
patrol vessel was spotted. Even if charges happened to
be brought in the USA, the potential penalties under US
legislation were fairly insigniﬁcant in comparison with
the harsher Canadian laws. Canadian penalties included
CAN$100,000 ﬁnes, conﬁscation of catch, impoundment
of vessel and possible jail sentences. In comparison,
the maximum US$10,000 ﬁne, under the US Lacey Act,45
could be treated as a justiﬁable business expense.46

1990 FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT
AGREEMENT
In an effort to address the problem of illegal ﬁshing,
Canada and the USA signed a reciprocal Fisheries
Enforcement Agreement in September 1990.47 The
agreement obliges each country to enact domestic
prohibitions making it illegal for its nationals to violate
the ﬁsheries laws and regulations of the other State
while within the jurisdiction of that country.48 As a result,
boundary violators ﬁshing illegally in one country’s
waters now violate the laws of both countries. The
parties also committed to consultations with each
other regarding the implementation of the agreement,
including the effectiveness of penalties and ﬁsheries
enforcement practices to be carried out in the vicinity of
the maritime boundary.49 Finally, the agreement obliges
Canada and the USA to make an effort to inform their
nationals, who ﬁsh in the vicinity of the boundary, as
to the law-enforcement practices of the other party.50

IMPLEMENTING COOPERATIVE
ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
Following the signing of the Fisheries Enforcement
Agreement, Canada and the USA implemented the
agreement through domestic laws, making it an offence
for non-authorized ﬁshing in the other’s waters and
providing for consistent penalties.51 The maximum
penalties for boundary violations have also been
synchronized to reﬂect the previous Canadian standards.
In addition, the two countries have held regular

39

© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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45

Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (1982).
See G.J. Herbert, n. 3 above, at 314.
47
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the United States of America on Fisheries Enforcement (Ottawa,
26 September 1990).
48
Ibid., Article I.
49
Ibid., Article II.
50
Ibid.
51
The USA has implemented the agreement by issuing the
International Fisheries Regulations, USA–Canada Fisheries
Enforcement, 50 C.F.R. §§ 300.140 –300.144; Canada implemented
the agreement with the USA Waters Fisheries Regulations, SOR/
91-660, revoked and subsumed by United States Waters Fisheries
Regulations, revocation Fishery (General) Regulations, amendment,
SOR/94-296.
46
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implementation meetings to review enforcement
practices and discuss the development of cooperative
standards, policies and strategies. Among the subjects
that have been addressed are prosecution practices,
evidentiary requirements, notiﬁcation procedures, the
interpretation of regulations and hot pursuit.52 Canada
and the USA regularly cooperate in patrolling the
areas on either side of the Gulf of Maine boundary to
deter illegal ﬁshing activities and monitor compliance
with applicable regulations. Fisheries surveillance
operations take the form of sea patrols, including onboard inspections of ﬁshing vessels, and aerial overﬂights. A more recent technique for monitoring vessel
catch locations is the use of vessel monitoring systems
(VMS), which apply satellite technology to monitor
harvesting operations electronically.53 To help ensure a
coordinated approach to ﬁsheries enforcement on both
sides of the border, the NMFS Ofﬁce for Law Enforcement
meets regularly with its counterparts in DFO to exchange
enforcement information. Data-sharing is also facilitated
by both countries’ memberships in the International
Network for the Cooperation and Coordination of
Fisheries-Related Monitoring Control and Surveillance
Activities (‘MCS Network’).54

EFFECT OF COOPERATIVE
ENFORCEMENT AND
MANAGEMENT ON BOUNDARY
VIOLATIONS
DFO records detailing the incidence of boundary
violations in the Gulf of Maine from 1988 to 2006
demonstrate the positive effect of the Fisheries Enforcement Agreement, and the cooperative ﬁsheries management measures implemented by Canada and the USA,
in reducing illegal ﬁshing. Violation numbers, which
had been on the rise in the years following the maritime
boundary delineation, peaked in 1989.55 Increased levels
of cross-border cooperation, coinciding with the signing
of the Enforcement Agreement, contributed to the substantial drop in recorded incidents of illegal ﬁshing from
1990.56 A further decrease in boundary violation
numbers occurred from 1994, following the two countries’
joint commitment to reduce ﬁshing levels and rebuild
stocks in the Gulf of Maine.57
Boundary violations by US scallopers declined when
the NEFMC closed large areas of the US portion of
52

See OIA, n. 7 above, at 109–110.
J.K. Randall, ‘Improving Compliance in US Federal Fisheries: An
Enforcement Agency Perspective’, 35:4 Ocean Devel. & Int’l L.
(2004), 287.
54
See OIA, n. 7 above, at 110.
55
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), USA Transboundary Violations
Canada/USA Boundary Line (unpublished document on file with
DFO, undated) (‘Transboundary Violations’).
56
See G.J. Herbert, n. 3 above, at 315.
57
See Transboundary Violations, n. 55 above.
53

Georges Bank to multi-species ﬁshing activities, in
December 1994, in an effort to restore declining
groundﬁsh populations.58 Among the closed zones was
a section bordering a signiﬁcant length of the Gulf of
Maine boundary, designated as Closed Area II. Since
June 1999, the southern part of this closed area has
been re-opened, as a controlled access area, to allow
limited scallop harvesting operations to take place.59
Fishing activities within this area have been closely
monitored, however, through the use of surveillance
patrols, on-board observers and the electronic reporting
of catches.60 There has been no recorded increase in
illegal transboundary ﬁshing in this region since the
limited re-opening.61 This management regime has
likely helped reduce the number of boundary violations
committed by US scallop vessels on Georges Bank.62
Boundary violations by groundﬁsh ﬁshers were less
of a problem in the years preceding the Enforcement
Agreement, as these stocks were in decline on both sides
of the border. In such cases, the risk of being caught did
not justify potential rewards from ﬁshing illegally.63 In
addition, Closed Area II, on the US side of the Gulf of
Maine boundary line, has continued to remain closed to
groundﬁsh ﬁshing operations. The cooperative management of groundﬁsh resources by Canada and the USA,
through the Sharing Allocation Agreement, is also seen
as an important factor in the prevention of current and
future boundary violations by groundﬁsh ﬁshing vessels.64

ASSESSMENT OF
TRANSBOUNDARY
COOPERATION
The forging of informal cooperative ﬁsheries management
arrangements for the Gulf of Maine region is positive
on many fronts. The arrangements have established ‘good
neighbourly relations’ in place of previous conﬂicts
and tensions over the allocation of shared groundﬁsh
58

D. Hart, Status of Fishery Resources off the Northeastern United
States: Sea Scallops (Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC),
National Marine Fisheries Service, 2001), available at <http://
www.nefsc.noaa.gov/sos/spsyn/ iv/scallop/>.
59
New England Fisheries Management Council, Framework Adjustment
18 to the Atlantic Sea Scallop FMP: Including an Environmental
Assessment, Regulatory Impact Review, Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis and Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation (SAFE)
Report (NEFMC, 2005), at 3-1, available at <http://www.nefmc.org/
scallops/> (‘Framework Adjustment 18’).
60
See D. Hart, n. 58 above.
61
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Canada/USA Enforcement
Treaty – Since 1991: Vessel Occurrences – Canada/USA Boundary
– Atlantic Coast (database maintained by Conservation and Protection
Branch, DFO Maritimes).
62
Personal communication with G. Peacock, Executive Director,
Federal/Provincial Relations, DFO Maritimes (19 July 2006).
63
See G.J. Herbert, n. 3 above, at 312.
64
See personal communication with G. Peacock, n. 62 above.
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stocks.65 While international law in relation to equitable
sharing of transboundary resources is still limited,66
with equity being an open-textured concept subject to
varying interpretations,67 Canadian and US ofﬁcials have
been able to reach a creative allocation accommodation,
with geographical distribution of the groundﬁsh stock
being phased in as the increasingly dominant factor.
The shift from historical catch emphasis to the geographical distribution of ﬁsh stocks in national waters
could be exemplary to other States of how equitable
sharing might be approached. The two countries can be
viewed as marching in step with the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea68 and its mandate
that where ﬁsh stocks are shared across exclusive
economic zones, countries are required to seek directly
or through sub-regional or regional organizations to agree
upon necessary measures to conserve and develop
shared stocks.69 Scientiﬁc and bureaucratic cooperation
has been achieved without high costs of administration
and formalized structures.70 Federal ofﬁcials took on a
difﬁcult task that was beyond the mandate and competence of the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine
Environment established in 1989.71
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short of modernization trends in ocean governance driven
by sustainable development principles,72 in particular
public participation, the ecosystem approach, integration and precaution. Perhaps the greatest criticism is
the ‘closed club’ approach, whereby industry and
government representatives, supported with scientiﬁc
advice, have controlled ﬁsheries management recommendations. The Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,73
meant to guide both national and regional ﬁsheries
management approaches,74 urges States to broaden
participation to include environmental and other
interested organizations.75

However, various aspects of the bilateral ‘under the
radar’ arrangements may be characterized as falling

The informal arrangements also appear to fall short of
implementing the ecosystem approach,76 sometimes
equated with ecosystem-based management.77 While
the ecosystem approach is still an evolving concept78
and brims with various uncertainties,79 the approach
does suggest some fundamental ﬁsheries management
shifts that have not yet been fully embraced under the
informal USA–Canada cooperative arrangements. Those
shifts include considering ﬁsh harvesting impacts on
associated species and marine biodiversity,80 and subjecting proposed commercial scale ﬁsheries to ecological
impact assessments.81 Canadian and US ﬁsheries

65

72

For reviews of the rocky relations over fisheries including a failure
to adopt a negotiated 1979 East Coast Fisheries Agreement, see
D.L. VanderZwaag, The Fish Feud: The US and Canadian Boundary
Dispute (Lexington Books, 1983); L.J. Prelli and M. Larsen-Becker,
‘Learning from the Limits of an Adjudicatory Strategy for Resolving
United States–Canada Fisheries Conflicts: Lessons from the Gulf of
Maine’, 41:2 Nat. Resources J. (2001), 445.
66
While the equitable utilization principle has been quite well developed
in international watercourse law, the meaning of equitable sharing in
other transboundary resource areas, such as hydrocarbon and mineral
deposits, clean air, fisheries and endangered species is less clear.
See, e.g., P.G. Cameron, ‘The Rules of Engagement: Developing CrossBorder Petroleum Deposits in the North Sea and the Caribbean’,
55:3 ICLQ (2006), 559; S.C. McCaffrey, ‘Book Review of “Sharing
Transboundary Resources: International Law and Optimal Resource
Use” by Eyal Benvenisti’, 17:3 Emory Int’l L. Rev. (2003), 1091; and
R.E. Hall, ‘Transboundary Groundwater Management: Opportunities
under Law for Groundwater Management in the United States–Mexico
Border Region’, 21:3 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. (2004), 873.
67
For six of the most common conceptions of fairness and equity,
see P.G. Harris, ‘The European Union and Environmental Change:
Sharing the Burdens of Global Warming’, 17:2 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl L.
& Pol’y (2006), 309.
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay,
10 December 1982).
69
Ibid., Article 63(1) (emphasis added).
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The Governors of Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire and
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on Conservation of the Marine Environment of the Gulf of Maine
between the Governments of the Bordering States and Provinces in
1989, printed in Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment,
The Gulf of Maine Action Plan 1991–2000 (GoMCME, 1991), Appendix.
State and provincial leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the wise
management of the Gulf of Maine and its watershed in the Gulf of
Maine Council’s Action Plan 2001–2006: Gulf of Maine Council on the
Marine Environment, Action Plan 2001–2006 (GoMCME, 2002), at 6.
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D.L. VanderZwaag (eds), Towards Principled Oceans Governance:
Australian and Canadian Approaches and Challenges (Routledge,
2006), 3. See also, D.R. Christie, ‘It Don’t Come EEZ: The Failure
and Future of Coastal State Fisheries Management’, 14:1 J.
Transnat’l. L. & Pol’y (2004), 1.
73
Food and Agriculture Organization, Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995) (‘FAO Code’).
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Ibid., Article 2.
75
Ibid., Article 7.1.6.
76
See FAO Fisheries Department, The Ecosystem Approach to
Fisheries, FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No
4, Suppl. 2 (FAO, 2003); Food and Agriculture Organization, Putting
into Practice the Ecosystem Approach To Fisheries (FAO, 2005).
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For a review of ecosystem-based management, see S.J. Hall and
B. Bainprize, ‘Towards Ecosystem-Based Management’, 5:1 Fish and
Fisheries (2004), 1. The FAO has preferred the term ‘ecosystem
approach’ to be consistent with use of the term ‘precautionary
approach’ and to ensure fisheries objectives are given due weight.
See S.M. Garcia et al., The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries: Issues,
Terminology, Principles, Institutional Foundations, Implementation and
Outlook, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 443 (FAO, 2003), at 6.
78
For recent international discussions on the ecosystem approach,
see Report on the Work of the United Nations Open-Ended Informal
Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea at its Seventh
Meeting (UN Doc. A/61/156, 17 July 2006), available at <http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/consultative_process.
htm#A/61/156>.
79
See D.R. Rothwell and D.L. VanderZwaag, n. 72 above, at 6.
80
FAO Fisheries Department, n. 76 above, at 13.
81
See D.R. Rothwell and D.L. VanderZwaag, n. 72 above. The scope
of the called-for environmental impact assessment may be subject
to debate in light of the FAO Code of Conduct’s recommendation
that prior impact assessment be undertaken before a new fishery is
developed or a new technology is deployed (Articles 8.4.7 and
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managers have followed a ‘sectoral ﬁxation’ of recommending catch allocations for three target groundﬁsh
species. Single-stock assessments, rather than consideration of ecosystem inter-relationships, have been
the norm.82
However, aspects of the ecosystem approach have been
adopted or are in the process of adoption in national
management systems.83 For example, the USA does
subject proposed ﬁsheries management plans to environmental impact assessment;84 while Canada, through its
National Oceans Strategy,85 calls for implementation of
the ecosystem approach where maintaining ecological
integrity and health are overall goals.86
The over-arching Canada–USA Steering Committee
framework has the potential to guide the TRAC and
TMGC processes towards broader ecosystem considerations. Working Groups on Endangered Species and
Marine Habitat, which feed advice into the Canada–
USA Integration Committee, hold promise, but it
remains to be seen how ﬁsheries interests and marine
biodiversity values are handled in practice.
Placing ﬁsheries management within an integrated
planning framework, also urged by the FAO Code of
Conduct,87 remains an unmet goal for the Gulf of Maine.
A fragmented array of transboundary cooperative
initiatives and arrangements exist.88 The most central
cooperative arrangement, the Gulf of Maine Council
on the Marine Environment, has largely supported
cooperative projects, meetings and workshops, but
has not played an integrated planning role and has
distanced itself from ﬁsheries management issues.89
Recent establishment by the Conference of New
England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers
of an Oceans Working Committee may hold some

82

See Transboundary Management Guidance Committee, Guidance
Document 2006/01 (Fisheries and Oceans Canada and NOAA
Fisheries, 2006), available at <http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/
tmgc/publications/GD2006_1_E.pdf> (‘Guidance Document 2006/01’).
83
For reports on Canadian and US initiatives, see G. Jamieson and
C-I. Zhang (eds), Report of the Study Group on Ecosystem-Based
Management Science and its Application to the North Pacific, PICES
Scientific Report No 29 (North Pacific Marine Science Organization
(PICES), 2005).
84
See Fishery Management Plan, n. 42 above; Framework Adjustment
18, n. 59 above.
85
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Canada’s Oceans Strategy:
Our Oceans, Our Future (DFO, 2002).
86
Ibid., at 4 and 12.
87
FAO Code, n. 73 above, Article 10.
88
See ACZISC Secretariat and Marine and Environmental Law
Institute, Dalhousie University, Overview of Current Governance in the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine: Transboundary Collaborative Arrangements
and Initiatives, Report prepared for Fisheries and Oceans Canada
(2006), forthcoming at <http://www.dal.ca/law/melaw>.
89
See D.L. VanderZwaag, ‘Transboundary Challenges and Cooperation
in the Gulf of Maine Region: Riding a Restless Sea Toward Misty
Shores’, in H.N. Scheiber (ed.), Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage
and Emerging Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000), 265, at 277.

integration promise, but the initiative could also add
another layer of complexity.90
The Canada–USA Integration Committee, although its
name may suggest an integrative planning function,
does not include key ‘players’. Local governments,
indigenous groups and non-governmental organizations
are not participants. Participation by provincial/State
ofﬁcials is not ensured.
While Section 31 of Canada’s Oceans Act91 requires the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to lead and facilitate
the development and implementation of integrated
management plans for all activities in or affecting Canada’s
estuaries, coastal waters and marine waters, planning
efforts to date have focused on marine areas within
Canada.92 The initial ﬁve large ocean management
areas selected for integrated planning implementation
do not include transboundary mandates.93
Application of the precautionary approach within the
informal bilateral cooperative arrangements has also
not been explicit.94 With no over-arching bilateral ﬁsheries
management or regional ocean governance agreement in
place, principles for cooperative management and practical
implementation implications have not been ﬂeshed out.95
The TMGC’s Guidance Documents, although at times
supporting risk-adverse groundﬁsh quotas, have also
advocated, on occasion, risk-neutral and above TACs.
For example, in its 2006 Guidance Document for the
2007 ﬁshing year, the TMGC recommended a TAC for
90
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The Challenge of Implementation (Kluwer Law International, 1996).
95
For reviews of how national systems have approached precaution,
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Conservation and the US Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996’, 24:4
Vt. L. Rev. (2000), 1351 and D.L. VanderZwaag et al., ‘Canada and the
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Wading and Wandering in Tricky Currents’, 34:1 Ottawa L. Rev.
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of Innovation – and Frustration’, 20:1 Va. Envtl. L.J. (2001), 119.
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eastern Georges Bank cod of 1900 metric tonnes (mt)
to be risk adverse to exceeding the ﬁshing mortality level
agreed upon.96 For eastern Georges Bank haddock, a riskneutral approach was followed whereby a 19,000 mt
TAC was recommended with a 50% chance of exceeding the ﬁshing mortality reference agreed to.97 The
combined Canada/USA Georges Bank yellowtail
ﬂounder TAC was recommended to be 1500 mt, slightly
above a risk-neutral level.98

CONCLUSION
While Canada and the USA have made substantial strides
through informal bilateral ﬁsheries arrangements for
the Gulf of Maine region, putting integrated transboundary ecosystem management into practice still seems a
distant goal. Canada and the USA, while being advanced
industrialized States with major scientiﬁc and organizational capacities, in many ways are lagging behind other
regions of the globe in modernizing and formalizing
transboundary ocean relations.99 Like the Gulf of Maine
Council on the Marine Environment, the informal
ﬁsheries arrangements might be described as nascent.100
Reaching an integrated ocean governance system for
the Gulf of Maine may require all arrangements to be
viewable on a ‘uniﬁed radar screen’. Formalizing the
existing array of fragmented cooperative arrangements
under a comprehensive regional agreement umbrella is
one navigational option with various routes possible.101
96
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Seas’, 15 Y.B. Int’l Env. L. (2004), 261. For a synopsis of how
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organizations, see Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and
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Moving swiftly towards more formalized arrangements does not seem likely in light of ‘missing ingredients’. Political interest and leadership supportive of
negotiating a new ocean agreement or agreements is
presently lacking. Champions of the cause have not
stepped forward and been vocal.
Even if agreement could be reached on the need to
strengthen regional transboundary cooperation in treaty
form, difﬁcult details would have to be sorted out.
Those devilish details include, among others, the
geographical scope of coverage; the breadth of ocean
development and management issues to be addressed;
incorporation of strong versus weak versions of sustainability principles; institutional structures; federal, State
and provincial roles; advisory versus decision-making
functions; relationships with existing organizations and
programmes having interests or relevance to the Gulf
of Maine; a ﬁnancial mechanism or mechanisms; and
dispute-resolution provisions.
While the voyage towards integrated ecosystem
management arguably has a long way to go, Canada
and the USA continue to steer their bows in the right
direction. Good neighbourly ocean relations are being
kept alive and incrementally progressing largely under
the radar screen of informal arrangements.
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